in practice the EU Charter into a living and effectively justiciable document for those individuals, whose fundamental rights are being adversely affected by EU law. The barriers to justice, which especially non-EU citizens currently face in cases of fundamental rights violations, have been often signalled as a matter of serious concern. 7 Since EU policies in fundamental rights-sensitive domains such as asylum and external border control are bound to develop further, the challenge to design and enforce such policies in a fundamental rights compliant manner grows tangibly. Hence, it is to be expected that the CJEU will be called more often to interpret and review the relationship of EU implementing national legislation and practices with the EU Charter, which is why a broader discussion on the subject is highly relevant.
We argue that the provision of 'facts-based information' bears on the merits of fundamental rights cases, and could therefore strengthen the judicial and legal accountability of the EU's AFSJ in general and the legitimacy of the EU fundamental rights architecture in particular. 8 For years now, NGOs and international and national human rights organizations have had an impact on litigation before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). By supporting enhanced human rights protection as third parties in 'hard cases', non-state interveners have contributed to the effective monitoring of the implementation of the European 8 Within the limits of this chapter, we do not address questions related to strategic litigation raising sub-questions on judicial independence. While it is true that civil society actors often choose to combine third party interventions with so-called 'strategic litigation' to induce policy change, the method of submitting factual and expert observations without representing either of the parties and therefore without necessarily taking sides in the dispute of a case is perceived as important in maintaining impartiality and independence. This was also confirmed in interviews held with legal representatives of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, Amnesty International and the Centre for Advice on Individual Rights in Europe held for the purposes of this chapter in Brussels on 25 January 2011 and 6 February 2011.
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) across the domestic arenas of
Council of Europe members. At present, a similar procedure for non-state third party interventions is lacking before the Luxembourg Court. As discussed below, through the indirect route of national courts only recently civil society and human rights organizations managed to formally reach the CJEU in a seminal case dealing with European asylum law.
The Luxembourg Court has often been accused of 'judicial activism', in particular with regard to expanding the scope of EU law and shifting the division of competence between the Member States (MS) and the EU. This Chapter claims that the opposite practice -that of 'judicial restraint' in the field of fundamental rights protection -may have disruptive effects on the legitimacy of the CJEU and the EU's AFSJ at large. The emphasis given to fundamental rights within the Lisbon Treaty calls the CJEU to stand up to its newly acquired position of a 'human rights court', a position that, as we show in the next section, will be in any case controversial. The 'knowledge and accountability gaps' on MS and EU regulatory agency practices with regard to the treatment of asylum seekers and the management of external borders, and the compatibility of these practices with the EU Charter, makes this all the more an imperative for the CJEU.
This chapter is organized as follows: first we point to the volatility of the term 'judicial activism' in the context of supranational constitutional adjudication in Europe; we then turn to the more helpful concept of legitimacy and the role that civil society and human rights organizations can play before the European Courts in order to ensure sound protection and practical delivery of fundamental rights. The analysis proceeds by discussing in detail the involvement of non-state parties in landmark asylum cases decided by the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts while also looking into prospective external border control cases. We conclude by outlining possible substantive challenges that transpire from the different procedural approaches of the two European courts.
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM' OR 'RESTRAINT' FROM THE LENS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE EU CHARTER
When reviewing the existing academic debate on 'judicial activism' in relation to both the CJEU and the ECtHR, three features -two general and one specific to the asylum and external border control legal domains -merit special attention. The first observation has to do with the fact that much like national constitutional courts, supranational courts that perform constitutional functions are inevitably subject to attacks of judi-cial activism. The second point refers to the methodological fuzziness and ideological charge of the concept. The third is a note of caution in particular with regard to the conceptualisation of the role of courts in protecting 'absolute' human rights. First, both the CJEU and the ECtHR can be understood as performing functions of constitutional courts 9 in the European constitutional space and are therefore not immune to traditional critics of judicial review 10 that point to the so-called counter-majoritarian problem, inherent to any constitutional adjudication. 11 Rather than being interpreted as a pathology of supranational adjudication, the accusations of judicial activism directed toward the CJEU and the ECtHR can be explained as a part of a broader governance shift, connected to the increasingly important role that courts have to play in society today. 12 Often when called to administer justice, such courts need to decide on questions of principle and the ensuing 'balancing tests' they apply involve difficult value choices that presumably cannot be entrusted to a handful of unelected officials -the judges. A court deferral to the political institutions or the national judiciary may however amount to a denial of justice. 13 Second, the very terms of both 'judicial activism' and 'self-restraint' are so vast and indiscriminate as to be effectively devoid of meaning. Where does law end and policy begin? How to draw the line when it comes to written or de facto constitutions? As pointed out in Chapter 10 by Arnull in this volume, when qualifications of judicial activism and self-restraint are directed toward the European supranational judiciary, such qualifications carry a certain normative cue. In reference to the ECtHR, the label varies when used by those who put an emphasis on national sovereignty and those who prioritize individual protection. Even though the ECHR was originally geared toward maintaining a minimum threshold beyond which human rights protection in signatory countries would not be allowed to fall, the progressive and open-ended way in which the Strasbourg court interpreted the incomplete provisions of the Convention has come to signify, in a significant majority of cases, enhanced protection for the individual, often (yet not always) at the expense of state autonomy. 14 Similarly, there is an overlap between those who are concerned about the loss of national regulatory autonomy and those who see the CJEU as 'activist'. The pugnacious manner in which the CJEU has deployed the principle of proportionality 15 against national measures restricting trade or the preference it gives to a teleological method of interpretation 16 in order to develop incomplete Treaty provisions has undoubtedly contributed to economic integration and beyond in the EU, albeit this approach has gained the admonition of some and the admiration of others. It seems then that, depending on the standpoint, for similar kinds of judgements the ECtHR has been equally praised and reproached for allowing too broad or too narrow a margin of appreciation to contracting states, whereas the CJEU has come to be seen as a villain or a hero 17 in the struggle between 'intergovernmentalism' and Europeanization.
However, there are some marked differences between the contexts in which the two European courts operate. Whereas human rights protection is the only raison d'être of the Strasbourg Court, it has been widely recognized that that the CJEU has developed its fundamental rights judi- MacMillan 2009 ). Of course, we aim to underscore a general pattern of the discourse without denying that the reality is far more complex and accounts that fill in the space between the two far ends of the spectrum abound. cial doctrine mainly in response to pressure coming from certain national constitutional courts 18 and has since been accused of adopting an 'instrumental approach to human rights'. 19 Importantly, the controversies over authority in the policy and academic debates on judicial activism at the ECtHR arise between the individual and the state, whereas the activism discourse in which the CJEU is often engulfed illustrate above all power struggles between the various national and EU tiers of governance; in this debate, the position and interests of the individual in cases of potential fundamental rights violations are, in our view, overlooked at best.
Finally, it needs to be acknowledged that also the most obstinate opponents of judicial review differentiate between its exercise in what has come to be known as 'absolute' and 'qualified' fundamental rights. 20 Discourses alluding to the so-called 'balancing metaphor' between 'liberty and security', which has spread out in EU policy-making since the events of 11 September 2001, 21 does not apply when absolute rights are implicated as they do not contain limitation clauses and therefore generate absolute obligations for the state. Certain constitutions, most famously Art. 79 para 3 of the German Basic Law, go as far as to encapsulate absolute rights -for example, human dignity, in 'eternity clauses' that are virtually inalterable 22 and are therefore afforded enhanced judicial protection. The ECtHR has interpreted as absolute rights Arts 2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment) and 4 (prohibition of slavery) of the ECHR to which the deferential doctrine of the 'margin of appreciation' does not extend. In particular, the Strasbourg Court has held on several occasions that 'the absolute nature of the protection' in Art. 3 ECHR is such that it does not leave room for balancing against other 18 rights or any public interest, including 'collective or national security'. 23 In this respect, the academic community has mostly remained dismissive to condemnations of 'activism' voiced by national governments that grudgingly needed to adapt to the ECtHR decisions. 24 Art. 3 ECHR has been of central importance when assessing EU asylum and external border law and practices. At the EU level, the European Commission has recently emphasized the way in which some fundamental rights envisaged by the EU Charter are also guaranteed in 'absolute terms', which means that they cannot be subject to restrictions and that any 'measures taken by public authorities that interfere with a right protected in absolute terms amount to a violation (an infringement) of this fundamental right'. 25 The debates on judicial activism and judicial review vis-à-vis human rights now arrive at a critical juncture in the legal development of the EU. After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU counts on a Charter that has the same legal value as the Treaties, with the close potential of accession to the ECHR, the establishment of a specific Directorate General inside the European Commission dealing with fundamental rights-related matters (DG Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship), and the setting up of a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). The effort to ensure better institutionalization of fundamental rights protection also needs to be examined against the Union's background objective of respect for human rights, now formally ranked among the foundational values enshrined in the Treaty. 26 The enhanced legal bases and thereby the strengthened mandate in fundamental rights protection that the CJEU enjoys today calls it to move forward and adopt 23 26 Art 2 TEU reads: 'The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the MS in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail. ' an approach more protective of human rights. In order to be perceived as legitimate in this changed context, the Court needs to strengthen the emerging judicial accountability of the EU's AFSJ, and in particular its asylum and external border control policies.
ROLE OF THIRD PARTY INTERVENTIONS IN ADJUDICATING THE EU CHARTER
When fundamental rights are adjudicated, civil society and human rights organizations third party observations (also known as amici curiae briefs in US context) can be particularly helpful in pointing out alleged violations by the authorities. The third parties supply contextual and 'on-the-ground' information, bringing additional evidence before the courts that the claimants, especially when having a vulnerable legal status, are not always able to ensure and pursue on their own. In the United States, where the legal institute of amicus curiae is long embedded in the litigation process, its impact in the field of human rights was perhaps most tangible during the civil rights era of the 1960s and 1970s, when the submissions of third parties played an important role before the US Supreme Court in documenting cases of voting, employment, housing and educational racial segregation. 27 Although adopting a 'data-driven approach' and allowing for interest representation in the decision-making process is clearly a function of the legislature, 28 submissions presented before the courts are not seen to impinge on the independence of the judiciary as much as the information presented in them is not in any way binding on the judgement. For Glenn, judicial legitimacy presupposes that a rule was considered in the light of all relevant data, both objective and attitudinal: the data should not necessarily be binding but should build persuasive authority for the court that attracts adherence in its audience as opposed to obliging it. 29 Moreover, 27 Civil rights activists, in particular the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) combined this approach with strategic litigation. The information submitted in the briefs has for the first time prompted the Justices of the Supreme Court to make use of statistics. See among others Mark V Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court (OUP 1994) . 28 NGOs and international organizations were also involved in the negotiations of the EU asylum package. However, their ability to influence the process was limited given the intergovernmental character of the decision-making process at the time. such information can actually help the courts to make well-substantiated and informed decisions in the light of a plethora of arguments showing how a piece of legislation actually works (or not) on the ground. If we accept that a judicial decision will be legitimate when adequately informed and when it constitutes an outcome of a truly deliberative process, in which all the relevant facts and interests were represented and brought to the judge their diverse perspectives, 30 as well as when the implications of a judgement in a certain complex area of law is seen beyond the narrow outcome of a case, then inviting and ensuring formal accessibility paths for third parties' input is surely of added value. In sections 11.2.1, 11.2.2 and 11.2.3 below we map out the procedures for access to the Strasbourg and Luxembourg courts and discuss how civil society and human rights organizations made use of them in landmark cases.
The European Court of Human Rights
The Strasbourg judges have been responsive to organized civil society and human rights organizations by acknowledging the importance of both the factual and expert information that third parties can provide to the legal issues at hand. 31 Under the original Convention system however, both individual petitions to the ECtHR and the possibility for NGOs to file observations to a case were virtually nonexistent. The history of the Strasbourg Court reveals a pattern of evolution that has gradually allowed for the individual to be truly placed at the heart of the system as this stands today. With Protocol 11 that entered into force in 1998, direct access of individuals to the ECtHR was institutionalized while following a trend developed through case law, since 1983 the ECtHR has interpreted the Rules of the Court to specifically allow interested third party participation in cases. After the adoption of Protocol 11, what begun as top-down reforms for third party submissions of both states that are not part of the proceedings and NGO's to be submitted to the Court, was eventually formalized via Art. 36.2 of the Convention which now grants the President of the ECtHR discretionary power to allow such parties to intervene 'in the interest of the proper administration of justice'. 32 Importantly, research on NGO involvement before the ECtHR shows that while submissions were filed in a relatively small number of cases in view of the total of ECtHR judgements delivered per year, the cases in which organized representatives of civil society chose to intervene were usually landmark decisions, changing the direction of the Strasbourg Court's case law. 33 Relevant to the present discussion on AFSJ and EU asylum and external borders law is the example of the Soering case concerning the UK's involvement in extraditing to the US an individual accused of a capital offence. Amnesty International was granted leave to submit an amicus brief which ultimately was quoted by the Court in its judgement -in it, the ECtHR established a precedent valid to this day that no individual within the jurisdiction of a Contracting Party should be sent to another state where he or she would be exposed to inhuman and degrading treatment prohibited by the Convention under Art. 3 ECHR. 34 The decision was later reaffirmed in Saadi v Italy 35 and Gebremedhin v France. In the latter, the Court agreed with the approach taken by the UN Committee against Torture and several NGOs including the third party intervener ANAFE, who argued in favour of the need for persons who run a risk of ill-treatment to receive access to an effective remedy suspending removal measures imposed on them by the country reviewing their asylum application. 36 It must be borne in mind, of course, that under no circumstances is the Court (or the parties) obliged to follow the line of reasoning followed by the interveners. In Saadi v UK, proclaiming short-term detentions of asylum seekers for determining refugee status as compatible with Art. 5 para 1 of the Convention (right to liberty), the ECtHR chose to side with 32 ECHR Convention, Art 36 para 2 reads: 'The President of the Court may, in the interest of the proper administration of justice, invite any High Contracting Party which is not a party to the proceedings or any person concerned who is not the applicant to submit written comments or take part in hearings'. 33 the defendant government despite legal arguments to the contrary raised by non-state parties. 37 The Strasbourg Court found that the UK had breached its obligation to promptly inform the applicant of the grounds of the detention under Art. 5 para 2 but reiterated that the fine line between the interest of the state in expediently handling mounting refugee applications and the non-arbitrary detention of asylum seekers for that purpose is based on the appropriateness of the detention facilities and the short period of detentions (up to one week). 38 The monitoring function of amici briefs remains highly important in this respect: should deteriorated conditions and extended length of detention occur, the ECtHR would be urged to find violations of Art. 5 para 1 in other cases.
The Court of Justice of the European Union
In the field of asylum and refuge law, such 'watchdog' and evidence/ expertise-provider functions are even more necessary at the EU level where the entire Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and the Schengen external border regime are founded on the premise that all EU MS have similar governance and fundamental rights protection standards. The literature has documented well the existing governance deficits and ways in which there is uncertainty about who assumes responsibility in fundamental rights violations ('an accountability gap') across the MS, creating barriers to access to justice and effective remedies for targeted migrant groups. 39 In comparison to the ECtHR, the limited locus standi for private parties before the CJEU 40 is coupled with restricted access to the Court for NGOs 37 See De jure, the scope for third party interventions is further restricted in preliminary rulings where interested representatives of civil society and human rights organizations cannot address the CJEU directly; their files and contributions are only passed on to the Luxembourg Court if they have been parties in the national judicial proceedings. De facto, observations in preliminary rulings are comparable to amici curie briefs directed to the ECtHR, as the submitting parties are not obliged to align their arguments with any of the parties of the dispute. The problem remains however -if a third party wishes to reach the CJEU as an 'intervening party', it has to submit observations before the national courts in the hope that a case gets referred by the national tribunal for a preliminary reference before Luxembourg. In some EU MS accessibility rules on third party interventions are more open than in others, leading to a high degree of differential (unequal) treatment amongst non-state actors depending on the national judicial system where the case is being held. There is, furthermore, no guarantee that the case will be subject to a reference for a preliminary ruling, which may pose further restrictions because the matter can become timeconsuming and resource-draining for civil society actors. In preliminary reference procedures the rationale behind restricting access to third parties has so far been that the proceedings before the CJEU are not contentious and 'fact-based' so that the CJEU is bound to offer interpretation of EU law without going into the facts of the case on the national level. However, in Section 11.3 we show that this is of less relevance in fundamental rights cases falling within the scope of EU asylum law, where in monitoring the functioning of the Dublin system a strict distinction between the facts and the merits of a case becomes less obvious.
The fact that the rules regarding interventions in the CJEU are more restrictive than in the ECtHR is a matter that various human rights organisations have raised with European Commission officials after the entry into force of the EU Charter. 43 An argument against reforming the present procedure could be the impression that third parties, when made part of the proceedings, may unnecessarily prolong the completion of cases. 44 However, if the contextual information presented by such parties helps the delivery of solid and unambiguous judgements that give sufficient guidance to the national courts in interpreting EU law in future cases then, au contraire, accepting extra input can prove timesaving. A legal practitioner of the CJEU commented on a pending preliminary reference 45 saying that (s)he would have appreciated additional input on the case but such input was not available. 46 Unlike the ECtHR, which has sometimes made use of the possibility given in the Court's rules of procedure to invite expert opinions at the Court's own motion, 47 knowledge, the CJEU has never deployed this procedure in fundamental rights cases.
Further, unlike the ECtHR which presents the arguments of the main parties in its judgements at length, the file with all the arguments advanced by the parties (and third parties) are not made public by the Luxembourg Court. In one of the last opinions that Advocate General (AG) Maduro penned before the end of his term at the CJEU, he argued that:
. . . in closed cases it is reasonable to adopt a general principle favouring access. This also means that in closed cases a party should be allowed to make public its submissions, or those of another party, on its own initiative; after judgment has been delivered, it is no longer necessary that they remain within the exclusive realm of the Court . . . 48 but the Court did not take this view. It becomes apparent that not only is there an outstanding issue of access to the CJEU for 'non-state third parties' who are disadvantaged vis-à-vis MS and EU institutions, but also that the accountability of the Court might be somewhat compromised as it could be argued that it remains dubious what were the exact arguments, information and evidence that the Luxembourg judges considered (or not) when delivering their judgements in a particularly controversial case. 49
Civil society and International Organizations in the EU's AFSJ
As discussed above, the submissions of NGOs and international organizations have helped shape the absolute nature of rights enshrined in Arts 2 and 3 of the Convention, the Soering case being a clear example. In cases within the scope of AFSJ, the main actors active through third party submissions before the Strasbourg Court and more recently before the Luxembourg Court are Amnesty International (Amnesty), the Centre for Advice on Individual Rights in Europe (AIRE), the Human Rights Watch (HRW), the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), the UK-based National Council for Civil Liberties (Liberty) and the Equality and Human Rights Commission, as well as the UN Committee against Torture and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 48 Joined Cases C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P and C-532/07 P Kingdom of Sweden v Association de la presse internationale ASBL (API) and European Commission [2010] OJ C317/6, Opinion of AG Maduro. 49 For a critical take on the overly cryptic style of reasoning adopted by the CJEU, see Marc Dawson and Elise Muir's chapters in this volume.
In Table 11 .1 below we record the participation of civil society and human-rights organizations in landmark asylum and border control cases before the two European Courts, demonstrating the existence of 'repeat players', i.e. of actors that have long-standing experience in submitting observations, especially before the ECtHR. If the procedure before the Luxembourg Court opens, non-state third party interventions in CJEU cases could become all the more relevant at times of designing new accountability-seeking mechanisms and exposing the remaining gaps and unfinished elements in the legal and enforcement fundamental rights architecture of EU AFSJ policies. The table shows that at present, in most cases before the CJEU, only the UNHCR managed to regularly reach the Court by deploying rather informal channels of access. On most of these occasions, as further discussed in the following sections, we argue that some of the logic and arguments of the UNHCR made their way into the final judgment, showing the broader potential that non-state parties submissions can have.
EUROPEAN ASYLUM LAW: THE DUBLIN II SYSTEM
A main gap in the EU asylum acquis is identified in the automatic borrowing for the purposes of AFSJ of concepts central to the establishment of the EU internal market such as 'mutual trust' and the principle of 'mutual recognition'. In the field of EU asylum law, the piece of secondary legislation the EU adopted known as the 'Dublin system' 50 has been met with strong concern and disapproval from human rights commentators and academics for having fallen short of international human rights standards in relation to, among others, provisions on refugees' exclusion, revocation and the principle of non-refoulement envisaged in the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. 51 In order to avoid multiple applications being filed, according to the Dublin II Regulation, the MS responsible for examining an asylum seeker's application is the one through which the applicant first entered the EU. The Regulation leaves the option but does not impose any obligation to the MS where an application was actually lodged to exceptionally suspend this rule, assuming responsibility on its own. 52 One of the main critiques that the Dublin II Regulation has therefore received is that it ignores the profound differences in national interpretation and application of the 1951 UN Geneva Convention, thereby treating all EU MS as respecting fundamental rights equally.
Since the CJEU only had limited jurisdiction in AFSJ before Lisbon, the argument was made that fundamental rights as general principles of EU law could have limited the discretion of national measures implementing EU legislation. The national courts and the CJEU would have been bound to interpret and, where appropriate, declare invalid national implementing or EU measures that fail to comply with the general principles. The CJEU has been far less stringent when having recourse to general principles in other no less controversial areas of adjudication. 53 However, in the run-up to Lisbon prominent commentators have rejected the flexible application of such to the AFSJ. 54 The Dublin II system premised on the 'non-rebuttable presumption' that, when examining refugee applications, all EU MS fully respect fundamental rights and rule of law standards remained unchallenged up until the N.S. case. 55 The building block of the Dublin II Regulation of equal human rights protection offered across the 27 EU MS sits awkwardly next to findings 51 58 Greek detention facilities were described as extremely poor, dirty, overcrowded, with insufficient beds, clogged washrooms and overall in unbearable sanitary conditions. As we show below, before long these problems were closely scrutinized by the ECtHR.
European Court of Human Rights Cases
In M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece 59 the ECtHR found not only Greece but also Belgium in breach of the Convention because, by sending an Afghan asylum seeker to Greece without assessing whether in practice the receiving MS complied with its ECHR and international human rights obligations, Belgium risked exposing the asylum seeker to the above-mentioned despicable conditions. The M.S.S. decision is particularly important in that its remit can be interpreted beyond Greece -in fact, if there is enough evidence for a systemic failure in the asylum system of any other EU MS, transfers to that state ought to be terminated.
In favour of the applicant, the ECtHR relied on no less than 22 reports from NGOs and human rights organizations that described the gravity of the situation in Greece and were directly quoted in the judgment. Similar to M.S.S, in K.R.S., the applicant, an Iranian national, under Art. 3 of the Convention, challenged the decision of the British authorities to deport him back to Greece where he feared both the reception conditions and the risk of being sent back to Iran without a real chance of the merits of his application being examined. Though the application was found inadmissible, in K.R.S. the ECtHR de facto ruled in favour of the UK, considering that since Greece has transposed both the Reception and the Procedures Directives under EU law, there was no reason to believe that it would not comply with its legal obligations. However, in M.S.S v Belgium and Greece, the ECtHR claimed that in the time that had lapsed between the two judgments, the situation in Greece had substantially deteriorated, as evidenced by the many submissions to that effect that the Court had received from NGOs. In particular, in M.S.S. third parties intervened: Amnesty and AIRE, the Commissioner, UNHCR and the Greek Helsinki Monitor. The Strasbourg Court quoted at length the report of Amnesty referring to the shocking living conditions in the Greek airport detention centre (para 165), as well as the UNHCR findings of Greek procedural deficiencies in determining refugee status that resulted in bundling asylum seekers with illegal immigrants or criminals, thus leaving Greece with a disproportionally low rate of refugee status granted per year (paras 125-127). When finding that Belgium was in breach of the Convention, the ECtHR attached great importance to the fact that the UNHCR had specifically informed the Belgian immigration authorities in a letter of the practice of direct or indirect refoulement in Greece. Notably, the ECtHR reviewed and rejected the arguments of other intervening third parties, such as the Dutch and the UK governments that tried to protect Belgium evoking the Bosphorus doctrine, according to which the ECtHR did not review EU legislation as such was considered to be equally protective of fundamental rights to the Convention. Ultimately, the ECtHR did not reflect on the Bosphorus formula 61 pointing out the fact that Belgium could have voluntarily taken up responsibility for the asylum seeker under Art. 3.2 of the Dublin II Regulation.
Court of Justice of the European Union Cases
In M.S.S the CJEU did not have the chance to give its interpretation 62 on the compatibility of the Dublin II Regulation with fundamental rights, as protected in the EU legal order. Such opportunity presented itself with the joined cases of N.S and M.E, 63 which became the first asylum case before the CJEU where non-state third parties intervened formally. Before getting deeper into the case, it is first important to note that since these cases covered the same subject matter, almost mirroring the M.S.S. case already decided by the ECtHR, the stance taken by the CJEU was hardly surprising and could be explained with a desire to ensure the harmonious interpretation of human rights provisions where there is an overlap between the two European jurisdictions. In this manner, there is no risk that the ECtHR will override its Bosphorus doctrine, 64 quashing a decision of the CJEU, which affords less protection to an applicant. The question remains vivid, however, as to the way in which the CJEU would have decided such a case ahead of the ECtHR. The role of non-state submissions revealing factual circumstances could have been of similar relevance in such instances.
In both N.S and M.E the applicants were challenging Dublin transfers to Greece and were supported by Amnesty, AIRE, the Equality and Human Rights Commission and the UNHCR who took part in the UK and Irish national proceedings, and were thus entitled to intervene before the CJEU. The importance of the cases is reflected in the unusually high number of interveners -the EU Commission and no fewer than 11 MS, as well as the Swiss Federation (in view of the validity of the Regulation to the European Economic Area), also filed submissions. The opinions of AG Trstenjak and the judgement of the Court briefly summarize the answers given by the intervening parties to each of the preliminary questions directed to the CJEU and side with some of the directions suggested by the UNHCR and NGOs. In particular, the AG and the Court agree with civil society representatives, the EU Commission and the majority of 62 Note that under the co-respondent mechanism previewed in the draft agreement on EU accession to the ECHR, the Luxembourg judges would have been given such an opportunity. See Council of Europe, 'Draft legal instruments on the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights' (CDDH-UE, 2011) 16 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/ cddh-ue/CDDH-UE_documents/CDDH-UE_2011_16_final_en.pdf (accessed 8 November 2011). MS that the EU Charter is applicable in both cases and that the opt-outs from the Charter for Poland and the UK cannot be considered as general. The AG and the Court further assert that although the Dublin II system is compatible with international human rights law from a strictly legal point of view, if the de facto overload of a MS's asylum system were to mean that rights protected under the EU Charter 65 would be adversely affected, then the other MS should be obliged not to deport asylum seekers to those states and to assume responsibility for reviewing their refugee status in order to apply the Regulation in accordance with EU primary law. The stance taken by Amnesty, AIRE and the UNHCR on that point is identical, leading to the conclusion that the MS can rely only on a rebuttable, and not on a conclusive presumption that all minimum standards established in EU secondary law would be duly observed in the receiving MS. It is notable that much like the ECtHR, in the M.S.S. case, the relevance attributed by the AG to the 'factual situation' concerning actual protection (or the lack thereof) of human rights in the receiving MS is evidence-based. It is here where the role of civil society and international human rights organizations becomes central, contributing to the principle of effectiveness according to which the realization of rights conferred by EU law may not be rendered practically impossible or excessively difficult. Neither the AG Trstenjak nor the Court commented on the legal arguments voiced by non-state third parties who maintained that the scope of protection afforded under Arts 1, 18 and 47 of the Charter combined with general principles of EU law should be broader to that afforded under Art. 3 ECHR. Instead, the AG simply restated the first limb of Art. 52 (3) 66 of the Charter, holding that the CJEU must ensure that the protection guaranteed by the Charter in the areas in which the provisions of the Charter overlap with the provisions of the ECHR is no less than the protection granted by the ECHR, as interpreted by the Strasbourg Court. Interestingly, whereas Italy, the UK and the Netherlands argued that the scope of the Charter does not extend beyond the protection guaranteed by Art. 3 ECHR, Germany maintained that Arts 4 and 19 (2) of the Charter 65 N.S. (n 63) 114, 122, 131, 135-6. The AG Trstenjak mentions the right to human dignity (Art 1), the right to be free from torture or other ill-treatment (Art 4) as well as the right to asylum (Art 18) and the right to non-extradition (Art 19) of the EU Charter.
66 Art. 52 para 3 of the EU Charter reads: 'In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection'. correspond to Art. 3 ECHR but that the scope of Art. 47 (right to effective remedy) of the Charter is wider than that of the respective Arts 6 and 13 of the Convention.
It has been noted elsewhere that Art. 18 of the EU Charter reinforces the protection of asylum as this exists under other international law instruments, thereby vesting a right in the individual beyond the prerogative of the state: 'the right to receive asylum', rather than 'the right to seek asylum'. 67 Moreover, in the Elgafaji 68 case, the CJEU was asked whether Art. 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive offered further protection in comparison with Art. 3 of the Convention. Art. 15 establishes the grounds for subsidiary protection, a legal mechanism complementary to refugee protection. The Luxembourg Court, prompted by AG Maduro, distinguished the high level of individualization of risk needed to trigger protection under Art. 15 (b) of the Directive from Art. 15 (c) of the Directive, which was found to offer more protection than Art. 3 ECHR. When elaborating on the relationship between the EU and the ECHR legal orders the AG was drawing on a UNHCR study referring to the divergent interpretations that the different EU countries have given to Art. 15 (b) and (c) of the Directive. Some MS have treated both articles as equivalent to Art. 3 of the Convention, thereby not allowing for protection that covers situations in which a person may be exposed to a risk by reason of the general background of indiscriminate violence in their home country, whereas others have adopted a higher standard of protection. The AG is far less parsimonious than the Court when acknowledging the significance of the judgement for the future development of an EU right to asylum. Maduro admits that interpreting the remit of Art. 15 (c) can vary depending on the emphasis one wants to put but that: 'The fact that there is weight on both sides cannot however prevent an interpretation from being identified which is suitable to guarantee the fundamental right to asylum.' 69 Thus, unlike AG Trstenjak, Maduro has put the emphasis on the second indent of Art. 52 (3), which can potentially allow the Luxembourg Court to go a step further than the Strasbourg Court in asylum protection. Again, and especially in view of time pressure in a court whose docket management is of perennial concern, the CJEU can be helped in defining the future modalities and exact scope of rights enshrined in the EU Charter by the legal expertise of third parties. The procedural constrains for non-states who wish to submit observations before the CJEU have resulted in a very limited number of such interveners in AFSJ and the design of rather informal, secondary channels to reach out the court. Actors who could engage resources such as the UNHCR have begun issuing written public statements 70 in the majority of preliminary references on asylum that have been dealt by the Luxembourg Court so far. The overall asylum and refugee cases dealt with by the CJEU are still few. 71 Although the UNHCR has not per se submitted observations as a third party to these cases, one of the appellants usually annexed the UNHCR file to their own materials, thus ensuring that the statement got through the Court. 72 Although UNHCR's submissions have not explicitly been cited in any judgment so far, in some instances the Court or the AG's reasoning bears similarities with UNHCR's arguments.
In answering the first question of the national court in Germany v B and D, the AG explicitly refers to and sides with the position expressed in the annexed submission of the UNHCR (para 68-69). The approach suggested by the UNHCR was also finally adopted by the CJEU, since the Court followed the AG on that point. Therefore, the CJEU declared that the fact that a person has been a member of an organization, which because of its involvement in terrorist acts is on the list forming an annex to the EU Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, does not automatically exclude that person from refugee protection, even if that person has actively supported the armed struggle waged by that organization (para122).
In Abdulla, the judges had to adjudicate on the conditions of cessation of refugee status. Not only did the appellants but also the Commission, as a privileged intervener, use arguments put forward in the online statement issued by the UNHCR, for example, that some basic conditions of livelihood are part of the protection, which the country of origin of the refugee whose status is to be revoked must be able to provide to its citizens. 73 AG Sharpston, in the case of Bolbol, indicated that she would treat the UNHCR statement as an unofficial amicus curiae brief 74 and has commented on both the arguments presented by the state interveners and the UNHCR. In Bolbol the main issue revolved around the exclusion of a Palestinian from the remit of protection afforded under Art. 1D of the Geneva Convention, as transposed into the EU legal order in the Qualification Directive. The Court agreed with the AG that in order not to qualify for EU protection, the person must have not only been eligible but should have actually availed herself of assistance provided by the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). The AG has been explicit about the importance of framing the possible interpretations of a legal provision, 75 an area where third party submissions matter. Regrettably, with the notable exception of Elgafaji, in the bulk of these early cases that follow the reforms in AFSJ and the grant of a reinforced human rights mandate for the Court, the CJEU has preferred not to argue with arguments based on the EU Charter.
PROSPECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS: EU EXTERNAL BORDER CONTROL LAW
The domain of EU external borders provides us with another illustrative example of an area of EU law particularly complex and highly dynamic, where the challenges of access to justice and lack of accountability within the framework of multilevel governance are acute. Frontex, which has 73 The UNCHR held that: '. . . safety and the possibility to exercise fundamental human rights, including the right to a basic livelihood are important indicators to determine the availability of effective protection. In UNHCR's view, in the absence of a stable security situation and of minimum standard of living, the criteria for cessation would not be met.', UNHCR, Statement on the 'Ceased Circumstances' Clause of the EC Qualification Directive (2008) 17, at http://www. unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,AMICUS,DEU,4562d8b62,48a2f0782,0.html, last accessed 13 October 2012). However, the CJEU has left this question virtually unanswered. See Abdulla (n 71) 77-80. In all likelihood, further clarification will be needed on that point.
74 Bolbol (n 71). Opinion of AG Sharpston, para 16. 75 Ibid. 48, 'As the written and oral submissions of the Court have made clear, the actual text of Art 1D is capable of supporting a wide variety of meanings' and ibid. 77, 'The written observations lodged with the Court suggest, between them, most shades of meaning of this phrase [protection or assistance ceased], from a total cessation of UNRWA activity to a cessation of protection in respect of a particular individual.' functioned since May 2005, provides operational support and assistance to EU MS in the control of the common EU external borders and coordinates joint operations involving various EU countries. 76 Since the inception of the agency, several voices have signalled the lack of accountability of Frontex activities and their compliance with EU law and the EU Charter. 77 Similar concerns have been expressed about EASO. 78 In light of the new Art. 263 TFEU, which foresees the possibility that when acts of EU agencies produce 'legal effects', such agencies can fall under the scrutiny of the CJEU, it is now possible to hold Frontex and EASO accountable. Even if the agencies have still not been the subject of a judicial action for human rights violations before the Luxembourg Court, some contributions of NGOs highlighted below reveal that especially Frontex will either have to reform its methods and approach, or such an action will only be a matter of time.
So far, Parliament has challenged the validity of Council Decision 2010/252/EU, 79 seeking the annulment of the contested Decision on the grounds that it introduced rules on 'interception', 'search and rescue' and 'disembarkation' which cannot be considered to fall within the scope of 'surveillance' as defined in the Schengen Borders Code. 80 The main concern declared in the plea rightly was that the Decision, adopted under comitology, introduced essential changes to the Schengen Borders Code sidestepping the role of Parliament as a co-legislator. Given the express unease of Parliament with the dubious human rights record of Frontex, 81 the choice of procedure for enacting legislation in this area becomes vital. 82 'The knowledge and accountability gaps' on external border control practices across the Mediterranean have been well documented elsewhere. 83 There is at present a multi-actor context of national and supranational authorities where responsibility for potentially unlawful actions causing fundamental rights violations shifts from one side and actor to another and becomes too volatile in nature, leaving a profound gap in democratic, judicial and legal accountability in EU external border practices. Frontex's joint operations at high seas and/or territorial waters of third countries have been accused by NGOs and academics of diverting or 'sending back' boats (so-called 'push backs') with asylum seekers. The HRW has presented two main reports 84 dealing directly or indirectly with Frontex. One of the reports has addressed Frontex's Rabit Operation in 2010, which constituted the first deployment of the so-called RABITs (Rapid Border Intervention Teams) to Greece in order to support the Greek government's efforts to control immigration along the Evros River bordering with Turkey. 85 The report categorically identifies and documents the role of Frontex that, despite knowledge of the failing asylum system in Greece, has been transferring migrants to Greek detention centres, thereby exposing them to inhuman and degrading treatment. 86 Further, the HRW stated that even if a strict 'chain of command' was not evident and Frontex was formally not a decision maker:
in practice it appears that guest officers deployed with Frontex were indeed making de facto decisions on the ground in Evros as they were involved in extensive activities, including the apprehension of migrants and in making nationality-determination recommendations that were, in effect, rubberstamped by the Greek authorities. 87 The other HRW report has focused on a joint Italian-Frontex operation, which resulted in the interdiction and push back of migrants in the central Mediterranean Sea to Libya. With the use of German helicopters, the Italian coast guard intercepted and reportedly handed migrants over to a Libyan patrol boat, which took them to a military unit in Tripoli. Frontex denied having diverted the boats, claiming that the agency's coordinating role was limited to patrolling the operating area. 88 The involvement of Italy in the extraterritorial interception of vessels in high seas, subject to a bilateral agreement signed between the Italian government and the Gaddafi regime, has already generated a case before the Strasbourg Court. 89 The ECtHR unanimously found Italy responsible for violations of Arts 3 and 13, as well as Art. 4 of Protocol 4 ECHR (prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens). The applicants, 11 Somalian and 13 Eritrean nationals, among them pregnant women, were part of a group of about 200 people who left Libya on board of three boats bound for Italy. Intercepted for search and rescue purposes by Italian customs and coastguard vessels in Maltese territorial waters, the passengers were taken back to Tripoli on Italian military ships. During the journey, the Italian authorities did not tell the applicants where they were being taken nor did they check their identity, leading them to believe, as reported by the UNHCR, that the boats were actually headed for Italy. 90 The crucial role of civil society and human rights organizations, through bringing about evidence and legal expertise, is visible in the interventions of the following third parties in the abovementioned Hirsi case: the UNHCR, AIRE, Amnesty, FIDI, HRW and the Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic. 91 On the basis of the information provided by these actors, on 11 March 2011, the Chamber relinquished the case to the Grand Chamber formation indicating the seriousness of the case. During the hearing, the UNHCR explained that it had accorded some 'pushed back individuals' with refugee status in Libya and that even the Italian authorities themselves had granted refugee status to individuals who managed to make it to Italy on a later attempt. 92 Out of a total of approximately 1,200 people sent back to Libya in maritime patrol operations, 916 were screened by the UNHCR staff and a full refugee status determination procedure was held for 73 -all of whom were found to satisfy international law refugee standards, thus confirming that the interception operations in question exposed refugees at real risk of refoulement.
The input delivered by the third parties in Hirsi supplied legal expertise to the Court, reinforcing the establishment of the scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction, necessary for Italy to be held liable under the Convention. Particularly, the Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic: 'drawing on international and regional jurisprudence, in the first section [of its submission] describes legal constraints on interdiction practices, including the extraterritorial applicability of the non-refoulement principle and the procedural protections that states owe interdicted migrants'. 93 With regards to the establishment of the facts, the Court relied exclusively on the information collected by UN organs, human rights organizations and NGOs, which included interviews with numerous direct witnesses. The reports, press releases and third party interventions of non-state actors were either directly quoted or referred to in the judgement (paras118, grounds for the Court to establish that, given the general situation in Libya (lack of asylum law, no distinction between asylum seekers and clandestine migrants, etc.), Italy breached its obligations under Art. 3 both by sending potential refugees to Libya and by knowingly exposing them to the risk of repatriation to Somalia and Eritrea, countries with a record of ill-treatment.
The implications of the Hirsi case for the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice are potentially significant: the possibility of the EU signing framework agreements with third countries modelling the one Italy has concluded with Libya, now becomes very limited as the compatibility of such agreements with the EU Charter, and upon EU accession to the ECHR -with the Convention -becomes highly questionable. The judgment is a serious incentive for the EU to clarify the legal obligations of Frontex concerning fundamental rights. It also provides an important illumination for the CJEU in terms of the future interpretation of collective expulsions on the high seas within the scope of Art. 19 of the EU Charter (Art. 4 of Protocol 4 of the Convention) and the importance of safeguarding the provision of sufficient information about procedures to people in need of international protection (under Art. 47 of the EU Charter, Art. 13 ECHR).
CONCLUSION
This chapter has explored the post-Lisbon relationship between the European supranational judiciary and civil society and human rights organizations, placing a particular accent on the role and potential of third party interventions for the development of AFSJ policies in the EU. While the benefits from 'non-state submissions' in facilitating evidence gathering and monitoring for alleged fundamental rights violations on the ground, as well as in providing legal expertise, are high, procedural rules still constitute fundamental barriers for these actors to have access to the CJEU. After Lisbon, the CJEU was granted full competence to hear preliminary references. In addition, the emphasis on fundamental rights in the new institutional architecture of the EU sends a clear message to the Luxembourg Court. If the CJEU wants to assert its legitimacy given the changed context, it will be expected to become 'more active' in the judicial oversight of the implementation of EU asylum and external border control law and their compatibility with the EU Charter. Being open to third party intervention is a healthy judicial practice and can be a protection against accusations of judicial activism (since the courts can refer to evidence produced by others; the M.S.S. and Hirsi case being clear examples).
In contrast to the CJEU, it appears that at the ECtHR amici curiae briefs practices are well developed and will probably continue to increase. 94 The incentives NGOs and human rights orgnizations have to go to the Strasbourg Court point to the perception that these stakeholders have of ECtHR's independency and established strength in dynamically shaping human rights protection on a pan-European scale. The third party intervention procedure could constitute a model to follow for the CJEU, 'in the interest of the proper administration of justice', a concept also intrinsically embedded in Title VI of the EU Charter on 'justice'. The future role of the CJEU in the wider constellation of European fundamental rights judicial actors that includes the national constitutional courts and the ECtHR depends on the choices that the Luxembourg Court makes from the early days of the Charter, when deference from a strengthened fundamental rights mandate can hamper the legitimacy of the CJEU, rather than improve it. Accepting input from non-state parties (civil society and human rights organizations) when elaborating on the principle of effectiveness and access to justice, and shedding light on the scope of the fundamental rights to prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment, human dignity, asylum and effective remedies as protected in the EU Charter may help the Court in its challenging task. Finally, judicial legitimacy closely interlinks with the legitimacy of the EU fundamental rights architecture and the EU as a whole. 
